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Abstract
On October 30, 1973, a New York radio station broadcast comedian George Carlin’s recorded
monologue, “Filthy Words,”’ which consisted primarily of the repetitive use of seven four-letter
words depicting sexual or excretory organs and activities, which could not be said on the public
airways.
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On October 30, 1973, a New York radio station broadcast comedian
George Carlin's recorded monologue, "Filthy Words,"' which consisted
primarily of the repetitive use of seven four-letter words2 depicting sex-
ual or excretory organs and activities, which could not be said on the
public airways. The recording was played near the close of a regularly
scheduled noon-time talk show on Radio Station WBAI (FM) to high-
light the preceding topic of discussion concerning the attitude of con-
temporary society toward language. Immediately prior to the broad-
cast, listeners were advised that the recording included language which
might be offensive, and those not wishing to hear it were asked to
"change the station and return to WBAI in fifteen minutes."'
On December 3, 1973, the Federal Communications Commission
received a complaint from a father who had heard the broadcast while
driving in his car with his young son.4 He wrote that, although he might
understand the "record's being sold for private use, I certainly cannot
understand the broadcast of same over the air that, supposedly, you
control."5 This complaint succinctly poses the problem: To what extent
does the F.C.C. control the programming content broadcast by the
stations it licenses?
Section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927,1 in its prohibition against
1. The monologue was from the Album "George Carlin, Occupation: FOOLE",
Little David Records. Citizens Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station
WBAI(FM), N.Y., N.Y., 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 95 (1975).
2. Id. at 99. There were seven words complained of: "fuck," "shit," "piss,"
"motherfucker," "cocksucker," "cunt" and "tit." See Appendix for text of the broad-
cast.
3. Id. at 96.
4. This was the only complaint lodged with either the F.C.C. or WBAI concerning
the broadcast. Pacifica Foundation v. F.C.C., 556 F 2d 9, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
5. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3030 (1978).
6. 44 Stat. 1172-1173 (1927).
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the licensing author-
ity the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted
1
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censorship, unequivocally denied the Commission any power either to
edit proposed broadcasts or excise any material considered inappro-
priate for the airwaves.7 "This prohibition, however, has never been
construed to deny the Commission the power to review the content of
completed broadcasts in the performance of its regulatory duties."'
The courts, both during the period between the original enactment
of the 1927 provision and its reenactment in the Communications Act
of 1934,1 and after, have consistently interpreted the provision the same
way. 0
Following its usual practice regarding the review of completed pro-
gramming in the wake of a complaint,"1 the F.C.C. forwarded the com-
plaint to WBAI licensee, Pacifica Foundation, to give it an opportunity
by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed
by the licensing authority which shall interfere with the right of free speech by
means of radio communications. No person within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall utter any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communication.
7. 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3033 (1978).
8. id.
Zechariah Chafee, defending the Commission's authority to take into account
program service in granting licenses, interpreted the restriction on "censorship"
narrowly: "This means, I feel sure, the sort of censorship which went on in the
seventeenth century in England-the deletion of specific items and dictation as
to what should go into particular programs.
2 Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 641 (1947).
9. KFKB Broadcasting Ass. v. Fed. Radio Commission, 47 F. 2d 670 (D.C. Cir.
1931). The court held that it was within the Commission's power to deny license renewal
to the station based on its evaluation that many of the programs broadcast served
private interests of the licensee. The licensee was controlled by a doctor who in the
course of a medical information program, often prescribed mixtures prepared by his
pharmaceutical association.
Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Fed. Radio Commission 62 F. 2d 850 (D.C.
Cir. 1932). The Commission refused to renew a license basing its decision on broadcasts
by a minister who frequently referred to pimps and prostitutes and made bitter attacks
on the Catholic Church.
10. See, e.g., Bay State Beacon, Inc. v. F.C.C., 171 F. 2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1948);
Idaho Microwave, Inc. v. F.C.C., 352 F. 2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1965); National Assn of
Theatre Owners v. F.C.C., 420 F. 2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969) cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922
(1970).
11. The F.C.C. attempts to maintain a complete file on the licensee presenting
all sides of an issue which may have arisen during the course of a license period. When
the renewal application is submitted, this file will provide some basis for the Commis-
sion's action regarding the license. (Broadcast station licenses are issued for a period of
three years.) In re Applications of Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147, 148 (1964).
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for reply and comment. Pacifica's reply discussed its view of the validity
of the broadcast. George Carlin was described as a "significant social
satirist . . . [who] finds his material in our most ordinary habits and
language .. ".."I' In explanation as to why the particular broadcast
was made, the reply stated:
In the selection broadcast from his album, he shows us that words which
most people use at one time or another cannot be threatening or obscene.
Carlin is not mouthing obscenities, he is merely using words to satirize
as harmless and essentially silly our attitudes towards those words .....
George Carlin often grabs our attention by speaking the unspeakable, by
shocking in order to illuminate... 3
The F.C.C. did not share the view that such material merited expo-
sure on the public airwaves and issued a declaratory order to that ef-
fect. 4 The Commission based the order on the authority granted it by
18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970), which provides: "Whoever utters any obscene,
indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall
be fined not more that $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years
or both." It found further statutory support in 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970)
which directs the Commission to "generally encourage the larger and
more effective use of radio in the public interest. . . as public conveni-
ence, interest, or necessity requires."
No sanctions were imposed, but the Commission directed that the
order be associated with the station license file. Receipt of any subse-
quent complaints would have forced the Commission to decide whether
it should utilize any of the available sanctions granted it by Congress.1"
Within the framework of the order the Commission reformulated
its definition of "indecent" in connection with Section 1464.16 The
12. 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 96 (1975).
13. Id. at 96.
14. Id. at 99. Such a order is viewed as a device to facilitate settling a controversy
between a listener and a station. Reconsideration of the Commission's action is avail-
able, and if controversy remains judicial review may be sought immediately.
15. The Congress has specifically empowered the F.C.C. to (I) revoke a station's
license, (2) issue a cease and desist order, or (3) impose a monetary forfeiture for a
violation of § 1464. 47 U.S.C. § 312 (a) § 312 (b). § 503 (6)(1)(E) (1970). The F.C.C.
can also (4) deny license renewal or (5) grant a short term renewal. 47 U.S.C. § 307, §
308 (1970).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970). "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000. or
imprisoned not more than two years or both."
A A B
3
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previous definition of "indecent" 7 was offered by the Commission in
1970 in In Re WUHY-FM18 when it said that the standard in the
broadcast field should be that "the material broadcast is (a) patently
offensive by contemporary community standards; and (b) is utterly
without redeeming social value."19
Subsequent Court decisions, specifically Miller v. California,20 fur-
nished the basis for redefining "indecent." The Commission pointed out
that "the concept of 'indecent' is intimately connected with the exposure
of children to language that describes in terms patently offensive, as
measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at the times of day
when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." 2'
The Miller standard which protects language with serious literary, artis-
17. The F.C.C. definition was based on the obscenity standards of Roth v. U.S.,
354 U.S. 476 (1957) and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). At that
time the community standard was held to be a national standard. Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U. S. 184 (1963). For the difficulties encountered by the Supreme Court between
the Roth and Memoirs decisions, See Note, 75 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1364 (1966).
18. 24 F.C.C. 2d 408, 409 (1970). Here, a taped interview with rock singer Jerry
Garcia of "The Grateful Dead" was broadcast between 10:00 and 11:00 P.M. on a
program with "underground" orientation. Garcia's expression of his views on life in
general was laced with some of the words under consideration in Pacifica used as
adjectives, expletives or substitutes for phrases. Examples are: "I must answer the phone
900 f---n times a day, man." "That kitid of s- t." "Political change is so
f ----- g slow."
19. Id. at 412.
20. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the matter of sending unsolicited sexually
explicit material through the U.S. mails, in violation of a California statute, was exam-
ined. A definition of obscenity which marked a retreat from Roth and Memoirs was
announced:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: a) whether "the average per-
son, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work,
taken as a while, appeals to the purient interest, Roth supra at 489, b) whether
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct speci-
fically defined by the applicable state law, and c) whether the work taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 15. The Memoirs test of "utterly without redeeming social value" was rejected
as was the national standard criteria from Jacobellis. This latter holding is further
strengthened in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
The Miller Court suggested two definitions of conduct which would constitute
"patent offensiveness:" (a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ulti-
mate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive
presentations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition
of the genitals. Id. at 25.
21. 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 98 (1975).
4
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tic, political or scientific value will be considered except when children
are in the audience.22
In reaching this conclusion, the Commission reiterated its view that
the pervasive and intrusive nature of the broadcast media provide the
rationale for closer scrutiny of material that might be suitable for some
other form of expression. The Commission outlined four important
considerations to illustrate why broadcasting requires special treatment:
(1) [Clhildren have access to radios and in many cases are unsupervised
by parents;
(2) [Rladio receivers are in the home, a place where people's privacy
interest is entitled to extra deference, ...
(3) [U]nconsenting adults may tune in a station without any warning
that offensive language is being or will be broadcast and
(4) [Tlhere is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the govern-
ment must therefore license in the public interest. 4
Utilizing the new definition of indecent and considering the special
nature of the broadcast media, the Commission sought to channel rather
than prohibit the broadcast of such language with its order. The implica-
tion was that a different standard might conceivably be used when fewer
22. Id. Pacifica stated in 1964 in its license renewal application that "it is sensitive
to its responsibilities to its audience and carefully schedules for late night broadcasts
those programs which may be misunderstood by children, although thoroughly accepta-
ble to an adult audience." 36 F.C.C. 147, 149 (1964).
The Commission, in its discussion of the relevance of a broadcast's being unaccept-
able for children cited also to Sonderling Corp. affirmed sub. nom. Illinois Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting, et al v. F.C.C., 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This is
"the first judicial decision upholding the F.C.C.'s conclusion that the probable presence
of children in the audience is relevant to a determination of obscenity." 56 F.C.C. 2d
at 94. Here the Commission dealt with two programs on radio call in shows which were
broadcast during daytime hours in which oral sex was a topic of discussion. One ex-
change is cited by the F.C.C. as follows:
Female listener: . . . of course I had a few hangups at first about-in regard
to this, but you know what we did-I have a craving for peanutbutter all that
(sic) time so I used to spread this on my husband's privates and after a while, I
mean, I didn't even need the peanut butter anymore.
Announcer: (laughs) Peanut butter, huh?
Listener: Right. Oh, we can try anything-you-know-any, any of these women
that have called and they have, you know, hangups about this, I mean they should
try their favorite-you-know, like, uh...
515 F.2d at 401, n.4.
23. 56 F.C.C. at 97.
24. Id.
I 3:1979
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children were in the audience and the program had some literary, artis-
tic, political or social value.u
COURT OF APPEALS RULES FOR PACIFICA
Those who had hoped that a definition of "indecent" might finally
be authoritatively construed by the courts in connection with Section
1464, 2 were to be disappointed when the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia relied on Section 326 of the Commu-
nications Act to vacate the Commission's OrderY
The Act provides:
Nothing in this act shall be understood or construed to give the Commis-
sion the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be
promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the
right of free speech by means of radio communication.8
The three judge court was split. The two judges comprising the
majority concurred on the result but did not reach the conclusion by the
same route. Judge Tamm, who wrote the opinion, reasoned that the
Miller9 obscenity standard as utilized by the Commission in its order,
required a finding that the subject matter of the Carlin broadcast was
protected speech under the first amendment,"0 and he therefore viewed
the action of the Commission as censorship under Section 326. He went
on to say that, even assuming the F.C.C. might regulate non-obscene
or "indecent" speech, the order was overbroad for failure to take con-
text into account 3' and vague for failure to define the class it sought to
25. Id. at 98.
26. See note 16 supra.
27. Pacifica Foundation v. F.C.C. 556 F.2d 9 (1977).
28. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
29. 556 F.2d 9, 16 (1977). See note 19 supra.
30. U.S. Const. Amend. 1 (1791):
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.
31. Judge Tamm interpreted the order as, in effect, creating a sweeping ban when
there is a reasonable risk that children will be in the audience. An amicus brief indicated
that large numbers of children are in the audience until 1:30 a. m. and indicated the
number of children does not fall below one million until 1:00 a.m. 556 F.2d, at 14. He
6




In his concurring opinion, Judge Bazelon addressed the first
amendment question. He reasoned that Section 326 prohibits all censor-
ship of broadcast programming content by the F.C.C. but that Section
326 is limited by Section 1464,3 which in turn must be limited by the
first amendment .3  He then looked to the standards of protection in
other media to determine if the unique characteristics of broadcasting
justified the expansion of governmental regulation. 5 The factors he
considered included privacy in the home," the protection of unconsent-
ing adults,37 the threat of a flood of filth on the airwaves,"8 the signifi-
cance of the technological scarcity of spectrum space,"' and the pres-
ence of children in the audience.4 0 Despite this multilevel examination,
Judge Bazelon also determined that there was no justification for creat-
ing a new area of regulated speech and found the order of the Commis-
sion to be unconstitutional." Thus, the order was held impermissible as
emphasized that under this order works of Shakespeare and portions of the BIBLE might
not be considered suitable. 556 F.2d at 17.
32. Id. at 17. Judge Tamm questioned which children the Commission was trying
to protect by its order, since age of minors is not mentioned as a factor, although it is
considered a significant factor in analyzing capacity for individual choice. Rowan v.
Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Nor did the captive audience theory impress Judge
Tamm. He found it persuasive only where it is impractical to avoid exposure, and
apparently he did not consider a twist of the dial an impractical measure. Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
33. See note 16 supra.
34. 556 F.2d at 18. The first amendment to the Constitution provides in part:
"Congress shall make no laws. . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press".
35. Id. at 20.
36. Id. at 25, citing to Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970). which
held individuals may require mail advertisers to remove their names from mailing lists
and to stop sending lewd or offensive materials.
37. 556 F.2d at 25, Citing to Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205
(1925). An ordinance making it a public nuisance for a drive-in theater to show films
containing nudity where the screen was visible to the public was held invalid. The public,
if offended, must avert its eyes. This measure is advised in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 91 (1971) where an individual was prosecuted for entering a courthouse wearing a
jacket with the words, "Fuck the Draft" on the back.
38. 556 F.2d at 29. This fear was considered unrealistic in view of the economic
impact of a public which considers itself overwhelmed by objectionable programming.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 28. Citing to Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), where a New
York Statute prohibiting knowing sales to minors of materials which appeal to purient
interests was upheld on the basis that children lack the full capacity for choice.
41. 556 F.2d at 30.
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censorship, and the words were not to be stripped of protection without
consideration of content or redeeming value. 2
Judge Leventhal, the lone dissenter, chided the majority for treat-
ing the F.C.C. order as though the broadcast of any of the "seven dirty
words" was prohibited when it held only "that the language as
broadcast was indecent and prohibited by 18 USC 1464. '11 He pointed
out that the Commission had indeed channeled its order in that it specif-
ically stated that the prohibition of the "broadcast of 'filthy words'
considered indecent, particularly when children are in the audience"
would not force on the general listening public only those ideas "fit for
children."44 He felt that the early afternoon hour of the broadcast was
vital to the order. 5
As he construed the order, it reflected an effort to define the word
"indecent" in terms of the same underlying considerations which
prompted the decision of the Supreme Court in Miller .4 In summation
of his position, Judge Leventhal said:
As a judge of what the Constitution calls an 'inferior court,' my duty is
to apply Miller unless and until the Supreme Court modifies it . . . It
leads me to affirm the F.C.C.'s effort to apply Miller in the context of
daytime broadcasting-when the protection of children is a compelling
state interest.47
SUPREME COURT REVERSES FIVE TO FOUR
On appeal to the high Court,4 in the opinion of a majority of the
Justices, Carlin's own estimation of his words as those ". . . you
couldn't say on the public, ah airwaves, um, the ones you definitely
wouldn't say ever . prevailed.
42. Id. at 21.
43. Id. at 31.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 32. Even the dissent in Miller abstained from discussing state power
over distribution of obscene material to juveniles. Judge Leventhal felt that the decision
pointed out that "exposure to children marks a special enclave in the law of freedom of
publication."
47. Id. at 37.
48. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S.Ct. 3026 (1978). Strong dissent was
registered by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stewart and White in two opinions authored
by Justice Brennan and Justice Stewart.
49. See Appendix for text of the broadcast.
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The Court, limiting the scope of review, found no effect of adjudi-
cation, rule making or promulgation of regulations in the Commission's
Order.50 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated the Court's
policy of confining its review to judgments, not statements in opinions,
thus avoiding deciding unnecessary constitutional questions which
might be raised by such statements. 1 The Court's examination was
confined, therefore, to the specific fact situation of the case: Was the
Carlin recording indecent as broadcast? Whether or not the Commis-
sion's declaratory order was to be upheld hinged on the determination
of that issue. To answer the question, the Court examined the two
statutes which were prominant in the opinion of the lower court and
posed two additional questions: Was the Commission's action censor-
ship within the meaning of 48 U.S.C. § 326012 May speech which is not
obscene, nevertheless, be restricted as "indecent" under 18 U.S.C. §
1464?11
The Court did not take issue with the traditional Commission prac-
tice of reviewing completed broadcasts in the course of its regulatory
activity" and noted that until this case the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia had consistently agreed that this type of review
was not the sort of censorship at which Section 326 was directed. The
Court pointed out that "[a] single section of the 1927 Radio Act was
the source of both the anticensorship provision and the Commission's
authority to impose sanctions for the broadcast of indecent or obscene
language,"5 and, therefore, Congress plainly intended to give meaning
to both provisions. Justice Stevens concluded that Section 326 did, in-
deed, allow the Commission to sanction licensees who broadcast ob-
scene or indecent language.51
50. 98 S.Ct. at 3032.
51. Id. at 3032, 3033.
52. 48 Stat. 1091; 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the
power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any
radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970). "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than two years or both".
54. 98 S.Ct. at 3033. See note 9 Supra.
55. Id. at 3034.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 3035.
269 1F.C.C. v. Pacifica FoundationJ 3:1979
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The Court then examined the meaning of "indecent" as it related
to Section 1464 to determine if the F.C.C. could sanction non-obscene
language. Pacifica argued that the meaning of "indecent" was subsumed
by the definition of obscenity delineated in Miller.8 If this argument had
been accepted, the absence of prurient appeal would have been critical
in determining the validity of the Commission's order. The Commission
had determined that the manner and content was patently offensive and
indecent, but distinguished the latter concept from obscenity on the
basis of lack of appeal to prurient interests. 9 Pacifica relied primarily
on the Supreme Court's interpretation of "indecent" under Section
146160 in Hamling v. United States"' where the words "obscene,"
"lewd," "lacivious," "indecent," "filthy" or "vile" were taken as a
whole and limited to "obscene." The majority distinguished the two
statutes, however, pointing out that Section 1461 deals primarily with
printed matter in sealed envelopes traversing the mails while Section
1464 deals with the content of public broadcasts.12 While the standard
as to the mails does require a showing of obscenity, 3 the Commission
has repeatedly interpreted Section 1464 to encompass more than the
obscene. 4 Based on prior decisions and the history of Section 1464, the
Court rejected Pacifica's argument and concluded that prurient appeal
was not a component of indecent language."
58. See note 19 supra, for discussion of Miller standards.
59. 556 F.2d at 98. Pacifica did not argue that the components of the Commis-
sion's indecency definition were not present in the Carlin Broadcast.
60. Section 1461 is directed at "mailing obscene or crime inciting matter - every
obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device or sub-
stance ... "
61. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
62. 98 S.Ct. at 3036.
63. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
64. [Wihile a nudist magazine may be within the protection of the First
Amendment . . . Similarly, regardless of whether the 'four letter words' and
sexual description set forth in 'Lady Chatterley's Lover,' (when considered in the
context of the whole book) make the book obscene for mailability purposes, the
utterance of such words or the depiction of such sexual activities on radio or TV
would raise similar public interest and § 1464 questions.
Programming Policy Statement, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2307 (1960). See also WUHY-FM,
24 F.C.C. 2d 408, 412 (1970); Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 R.R. 2d 285, on
reconsideration, 41 F.C.C. 2d 777 (1973), aff'd on other grounds sub nom, Illinois
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 515 F. 2d 397 (1975); Mile High
Stations, Inc., 28 F.C.C. 795 (1960); PalmettoBroadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962).
65. 98 S. Ct. at 3036.
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Finally, Justice Stevens addressed the constitutional attacks made
by Pacifica. By refusing to step outside the bounds of the specific
"factual context," the court rejected Pacifica's first contention that the
breadth of the Commission's interpretations required reversal whether
the broadcast of "filthy words" was protected or not.6" The Commission
had apparently emphasized the narrow scope of its order to the satisfac-
tion of the Court, thus the Court was unwilling to rule on the basis of
hypothetical situations which might or might not arise in the future.67
The Court also found its ruling to be consistent with Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. Inc. v. F.C.C.,1s where it rejected an argument that
the Commission's regulations defining the fairness doctrine were so
vague as to abridge the broadcasters' freedom of speech.69 The Court
dismissed concerns of self censorship in the context of this controversy
with the observation that "at most, however, the Commission definition
of indecency will deter only the broadcasting of patently offensive refer-
ences to excretory and sexual organs and activities" 70 and felt that the
effect would be one of form, not content, since there are very few
thoughts that could not be expressed by less offensive language.7'
Pacifica's insistence that the first amendment forbids curtailing the
right to broadcast material which is not obscene led the Court to exam-
ine the effect of the content, the context, and the medium of delivery
on any interpretations of speech as protected or not. The opinion
stopped short of finding a general power to regulate the broadcast of
"indecent" speech in any circumstances but did not indicate that such
a notion was abhorrent or even implausible.
In outlining the limitations which have emerged, the Court cited to
Shenck v. United States,73 the earliest case of significance in which the
problem of protected speech arose. There Chief Justice Holmes ob-
served that only where a "clear and present danger" to the public wel-
66. Id.
67. Id. at 3037. "Invalidating any rule on the basis of its hypothetical application
to situations not before the court is 'strong medicine' to be applied 'sparingly and only
as a last resort."' Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
68. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
69. Id. The Court rejected the notion that broadcasters would respond to ihe
vagueness by refusing to present controversial political and social programs.
70. 98 S. Ct. at 3037.
71. Id. at note 18.
72. Id. "[]f the government has any such power, this was an appropriate occasion
for its exercise."
73. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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fare arose could expression be prohibited.7 4 The Court proceeded to note
other instances of expression where regulation has been considered ap-
propriate;7" for example, "fighting words, ' 7 distinctions between com-
mercial speech and other varieties, 77 libels against private citizens as
opposed to public officials78 and obscenity which might be wholly pro-
hibited.7 In this analysis, the specific matter of the "seven dirty words"
arose again, and the Court found no rationale for protection on a con-
tent basis. The Court recognized that the government must remain neu-
tral in the marketplace of ideas and found no political idea of opinion
at issue. It characterized the monologue as a point of view and offered
it no special protection." Two instances were cited in which one of the
seven words was afforded protection,"1 but the Court recalled there was
74. Id. at 52. This case involved the wartime mailing circulars to draftees urging
noncompliance and insubordination. Justice Holmes wrote:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all
that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights.
But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done
• ..The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing panic. It does not even protect a man
from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force
... .The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
75. 98 S. Ct. at 3038.
76. Id. Citing to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) as the first
in a line of cases where the state interest in preventing violence curtailed the speaker's
rights: "the fear was that the provocativeness of the speech would so enrage either the
immediate addressee or audience generally so that violence might result." See
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1164 (9th ed. 1975).
77. 98 S. Ct. at 3038 citing Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977). See also
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
78. 98 S. Ct. at 3038 citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
79. 98 S.Ct. at 3038 citing Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, rehearing denied, 355 U.S.
852 (1957) sparked the controversy concerning first amendment protection of obscenity.
See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
See note 19 supra. C.F. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) where
an ordinance seeking to contain the showing of explicit "adult" movies by means of
zoning regulations was upheld.
80. 98 S.Ct. at 3038. The Court in Note 22 offered no reason why it could not
accept Carlin's monologue as satire, but hints that, if it could, protection might be in
order.
81. Id. at 3039 citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973), a reversal of a
disorderly conduct conviction. The Court noted that the words, "We'll take the fucking
street later, or again," were not obscene when uttered by an anti-war demonstrator after
1 272
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no dispute as to the "vulgar," "offensive" or shocking quality of the
language and merely assumed arguendo that the Carlin language would
be protected in other contexts.82
The Court noted that the broadcast media have historically re-
ceived the "most limited first amendment protection." 3 This may be
readily observed if the status of newspaper publishers is contrasted to
that of broadcasters in the matter of fairness in presenting issues to the
public. 4 Although newspaper publishers need not provide space for re-
plies from those they criticize, 5 broadcasters must provide reasonable
free time for reply to the targets of their criticism.88 The Court examined
the two qualities of the broadcast media which make them unique: the
pervasuve presence in the lives of all Americans, especially considering
the privacy of the home, 7 and the accessibility to children, even those
too young to read.8 In the eyes of the Court the fact that individuals
may merely turn the dial to the "off" position or another station does
not offer enough protection to the unwilling listener in his home. 9 What
the Court saw as more important, however, was the policy of supporting
"parents' claim to authority in their household and the government's
interest in the well being of its youth.""0
The Court found the Commission's examination of context and its
use of the nuisance theory appropriate. The opinion emphasized the
variables such as time of day and the content of the program in which
the questionable language is used. In addition, audience composition
and the differences between radio, television and even closed circuit
television must be considered. The opinion concluded by alluding to Mr.
police had cleared the street. See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), See note
25 supra. The Court in Cohen rejected the argument that unwilling viewers would be
offended by a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" as there was no evidence that
anyone had objected.
82. 98 S.Ct. at 3039.
83. Id. at 3040.
84. Id.
85. Id. citing to Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
86. 98 S. Ct. at 3040 citing Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367,, 390
(1969). In application of the fairness doctrine, the Court said "[ilt is the purpose of the
first amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas . . . rather than to
countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the government itself or
a private licensee. .. "
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Justice Sutherland's characteristic of nuisance as "merely a right thing
in a wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard"9' and
held that "when the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor,
the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the
pig is obscene." 2
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Justice Black-
mun, considered the channeling of the order is an effort to protect
children in the audience most appropriate.93 He agreed that the unique
qualities of broadcasting and the resulting limitations placed on the
media's first amendment protection, as well as its widespread availabil-
ity in the home and to young chidren, were basic to the decision. He
conceded that the listener may tune out and that broadcasters may warn
before the program begins, but Justice Powell was particularly con-
cerned with the unsuspecting listener who has no warning. The covers
of books and records or the marquees of theaters were considered to
offer a warning, but the unwilling broadcast listener might be required
to "absorb the first blow" of offensive speech.94 In public, this might be
acceptable, but the listener in the home required special consideration."
He considered it sufficient protection that the Carlin material is avail-
able at live performances and on records and that it is not entirely
prohibited from the airwaves.99
Justice Powell departed from the majority in order to take issue
with the extent to which the majority examined the content of the broad-
cast. In his opinion, the Justices of the Supreme Court are not the sole
arbiters of "valuable" speech and the resulting degree of protection, and
that "line(s) may be drawn on the basis of content without violating the
government's obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected com-
munications. 917 It appears that it was Justice Powell's belief that the
91. Id. citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
92. 98 S.Ct. at 3041.
93. Id. at 3044.
94. Id. at 3045.
95. Id. at 3046. Justice Powell did not brush aside the argument of Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957), that adults will be reduced to listening only to what
is appropriate for children, and instead said it is a problem to be reckoned with, but
not with the result that the Commission should have no power to regulate this type of
broadcast.
96. Id. at 3046. In addition to the late evening hours, Justice Powell writes that
there is no apparent prohibition of the broadcast of "discussions of the contemporary
use of language at any time during the day." Curiously this is how Carlin's broadcast
is characterized by Pacifica and the Court of Appeals. 556 F.2d 9 (1977).
97. 98 S.Ct. at 3046, 3047 quoting Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S.
14
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Commission's order would have been more appropriate if it were specif-
ically a regulation of time of broadcast.
The four dissenters unanimously disagreed with the majority's
broad interpretation of "indecent" in Section 1464.1s' The Court had
recently construed the descriptive language of Section 1461 in Hamling
v. United States," the dissenters saw no rationale for departure from
that rule. They felt "indecent" had the same meaning as "obscene" as
defined by Miller,' and that this was not a novel construction.', They
also noted that the F.C.C. had indicated it followed this construction
as to the 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1968) prohibition of "obscene, lewd, lasci-
vious, filthy or indecent" telephone calls.102 Furthermore, although Sec-
tion 1461 and Section 1464 were not enacted together, they were codi-
fied together in the 1948 Criminal Code obscenity chapter, and the
dissent read them as prohibiting nothing more."13 That the Carlin mon-
ologue was not obscene was, in the opinion of the dissenters, undisputed.
Therefore, they reasoned that the Commission had no statutory author-
ity to ban the broadcast. 04
Justice Brennan was not so temperate in his dissenting opinion
where he was joined by Justice Marshall.' In fact, in his opinion,
whether or not the pig was obscene, the majority had burned the house
to roast it!' He deplored what he viewed as a step toward the
50, 63-73 (1976) where the Court held "regulation of the places where sexually explicit
films may be exhibited is unaffected by whatever social, political or philosophical mes-
sage the film may be intended to communicate".
98. 98 S.Ct. at 3055. Justice Stewart's dissent, in which Justices Brennan, White
and Marshall join.
99. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). The words "obscene," "lewd", "lascivious", "indecent",
"filthy" or "vile," were taken as a whole and construed to mean "obscene."
100. See note 19 supra for Miller discussion and standards.
101. 98 S.Ct. at 3056. Justice Stewart cites to Dunlop v. U.S. 165 U.S. 486, 500-
501 (1897), and Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482-484, 487 (1962).
102. 98 S.Ct. at 3056 note 7. When the Federal Communications Act was
amended in 1968 to prohibit "obscene, lewd, lasvicious, filthy or indecent" telephone
calls, Pub. L. 90-299, 82 Stat. 112, 47 U.S.C. § 223, the F.C.C. indicated that it thought
this language covered only "obscene" telephone calls. See H.R. Rep. No. 1109, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., 7-8 (1968).
103. 98 S.Ct. at 3056.
104. Id. Two additional points are addressed in the footnotes of the dissenting
opinion. First, the F.C.C.'s attempted use of 47 U.S.C. § 303(9) failed as an independent
basis for its action. Second, the general rule of levity in construction of criminal statutes
supported the dissent's position.
105. 98 S.Ct. at 3047.
106. Id. at 3049.
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"homogenization of radio communications" 107 and could find no justifi-
cation for the majority holding, given either the intrusive nature of the
broadcasting media or the presence of unsupervised children in the audi-
ence."'8 Justice Brennan wrote that "the invasion of a privacy interest
must be affected in an intolerable manner before government action in
prohibiting discourse is justified.""1 9 Additionally, the action of the indi-
vidual in listening, even in the home, should more properly be viewed
as having an affirmative component, as a "decision to take part. . . in
an ongoing public discourse."' 10 This is a situation far removed from the
"intrusive modes of communiation, such as sound trucks," [since] '[tjhe
radio can be turned off' . . . -and with a minimum of effort.""' The
Pacifica decision reflected, in his opinion, an improper balancing of
interests totally unsupported by precedent. He noted that Rowan v. Post
Office Department,"2 on which the court relied, left the decision as to
the offensiveness of material, and whether or not such material may
come into the home, entirely in the hands of the individual house-
holder."'
Undeniably, he felt, the government has a special interest in the
well-being of children; this has been provided for by the "variable ob-
scenity" standard of Ginsberg v. N. Y."I The subsequent Miller decision
has not been specifically related to the Ginsberg formulation, but Justice
Brennan insisted that controlled speech, even as to children, must have
some significant erotic content." 5 He felt that "Itihe Court's refusal to
follow its own pronouncements is especially lamentable since it has the
anomalous subsidiary effect, at least in the radio context at issue here,
of making completely unavailable to adults, material which may not
constitutionally be kept even from children.""'
107. Id. at 3048.
108. Id. In Justice Brennan's opinion, there are no "limiting principles" by which
to maintain either standard.
109. 98 S.Ct. at 3048, quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 21 (1971).
110. 98 S.Ct. at 3048. See Note, Filthy Words, the F.C.C., and the First Amend-
ment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REV. 579, 618 (1975).
Ill. Id. at 3049, citing Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302
(1974).
112. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). !iSee note 34 supra.
113. 98 S.Ct. at 3049.
114. Id. at 3050, citing 590 U.S. 629 (1968), Justice Brennan noted the adoption
of a standard in that case "that permits the prurient appeal of material available to
children to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests of minors."
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,1 Justice Brennan was disturbed by what he termed the lack of princi-
pled limits for the two major elements on which the decision was based.
To what extent may control in the name of intrusion into the home and
the protection of children evolve? If taken to the logical extreme, much
of what was considered appropriate might be subject to regulation," 7
and he was not content to rely on either the judgement of the F.C.C. or
the ability of the Court to assess the worth of the various types of
speech."' "I would place the responsibility and the right to weed worth-
less and offensive communications from the public airways where it
belongs and where, until today, it resided: in a public free to choose
those communications worthy of its attention from a marketplace un-
sullied by the censor's hand."" 9
Justice Brennan pointed out that words chosen to express an idea
may be, in a sense, interwoven with the idea itself and that, in purging
the words, a censoring of the idea will result.' He also believed the
majority's reliance on Young v. American Mini Theatres2' was in
error since Young, unlike Pacifica, had "goals other than the channel-
ing of protected speech."' No apparent object other than the channel-
ing of speech existed in the Commission's order, and while Young did
not restrict the access of the material in the marketplace, Justice
Brennan believed the order in Pacifica totally prohibits broadcasters
from sending or listeners receiving the material.'2
Finally, he deplored the "ethnocentric myopia" of the Court for a
117. Id. at 3051: i.e., The rationale could justify the banning from the radio of
many great literary works, repress- a good deal of political speech such as the Nixon
tapes, and even some parts of the BIBLE.
118. Id. at 3052.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 3053, referring to Justice Harlan's opinion in Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 21, 23, 25 (1971).
[Miuch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function ... In fact,
words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We
cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive
content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function
which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the
overall message sought to be communicated.
121. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). The Court in Young found zoning ordinances seeking
to contain exhibition of potentially offensive material in the interest of maintaining the
integrity of the neighborh6od to be an acceptable form of regulation.
122. 98 S.Ct. at 3053.
123. Id. at 3054. As with the words themselves, Justice Brennan believed that the
choice of the medium of delivery lies outside the hands of the government.
13:1979
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decision which he felt reflected a lack of sensitivity to at least some of
the subcultures in our nation.'24 Justice Brennan felt the holding might
be likely to affect broadcasters in serving some minority groups and,
consequently, Justice Brennan finds the character of the holding re-
flected "another of the dominant culture's inevitable efforts to force
those groups who do not share its mores to conform to its way of
thinking, acting and speaking."'
IN THE WAKE OF THE DECISION
The decision strikes down a major effort by the broadcasting estab-
lishment to stake out new first amendment protection for that media.12
Broadcasting magazine, the major journal of its industry, editorially
deplored and was astonished by the court ruling which, in its opinion,
had created a substitute for the eroded justification of "scarcity" of
broadcast facilities to give the government hands on control. Armed
with the criteria of broadcasting's pervasiveness and its unique access
to children, future regulators have been practically invited to intrude in
broadcast operations.'21
The National Association of Broadcasters fears that with Pacifica
under its belt, the F.C.C. will not stop with the seven dirty words and
the original list of words will be expanded, further abridging broadcast-
ers' first amendment freedom. 28 That fear may not be unrealistic.
Georgia legislator Julian Bond recently announced plans to file a suit
against the F.C.C. for failing to act on his complaint that a guberna-
torial candidate used the word "nigger" in his political advertising.
Bond attempted, unsuccessfully, to intervene in the Pacifica case to have
the word included as the eighth dirty word. Although Bond is opposed
to such censorship, he feels that if there are seven proscribed words, why
not eight?121
124. Id. Several studies were cited which indicated that in the Black vernacular
at least such words as "fuck" and "bullshit" have no obscene or even derogatory
component except in certain contexts.
125. Id. at 3054.
126. The whole commercial broadcasting industry intervened in the action in
support of Pacifica to argue against the "F.C.C.'s authority to create a new constitu-
tional exception for the prosecution of the broadcasting industry". BROADCASTING July
10, 1978, at 58.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 21.
129. INSIDE RADIO, August 14, 1978, at 1.
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 15
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol3/iss1/15
The Court emphasized the narrowness of the holding. The F.C.C.,
both in speeches and in the recent decision on a Morality in Media
complaint against WGBH-TV, Boston, has indicated that it will follow
the Court's insistence that the ruling was narrow. Commissioner Tyrone
Brown in a July 23, 1978, speech to the Oklahoma Association of
Broadcasters said that the Commission would not use Pacifica "as an
excuse for increased intervention" in programming decisions.,"0 This
pledge was backed up by the Commission's July, 1978 decision to renew
the license of WGBH-TV,I3 rejecting the complaint filed by Morality
in Media of Massachusetts regarding allegedly obscene and indecent
material broadcast by the station. 3 1 In rendering the decision the Com-
mission stated: "We believe that we should construe the Pacifica holding
consistent with the paramount importance we attach to encourage free
ranging programming and editorial discretion by broadcasters...,,3
The WGBH decision, according to F.C.C. Chairman Charles D. Ferris,
"should show that the F.C.C. is not going to become a censor...
hopefully it will prevent an outpouring of audience complaints based on
occasional words.' 3 4
While the Commission disavows that the Pacifica decision will
serve as a basis for more program control, it remains to be seen whether
or not the decision will be invoked by the F.C.C. and the other regula-
tory agencies in proceedings now in progress.' 3' Is it true that, in the
words of Chairman Ferris, the holding of the Pacifica decision is so
narrow that the likelihood of its being invoked "is about as likely to
occur as Halley's Comet,'' or will Pacifica stand as marshall for a
forming parade of horribles?
Fran Avery Arnold
Cara Ebert Cameron
130. BROADCASTING, July 24, 1978 at 32.
131. 43 R.R. 2d 1436 (1978).
132. Id. The Commission held that the examples cited by MMM did not meet
either the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity or "indecent" as the Court held its
ruling did not extend to the occasional use of an expletive. The words complained of as
indecent were broadcast twice in one program aired after 11:00 P.M. and one word was
broadcast in a play at 5:30 P.M. The Commission said late night programming was not
included within the Pacifica Ruling, nor would the broadcast of one word be included.
133. Id.
134. BROADCASTING, July 24, 1978, at 32.
135. Specifically both F.C.C. and F.T.C. inquiries into children's television pro-
gramming and advertising.
136. BROADCASTING, July 24, 1978, at 31.
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APPENDIX
The following is a verbatim transcript of "Filthy Words" prepared
by the Federal Communications Commission.'
"Aruda-du, ruba-to, ruba-to. I was thinking about the curse words
and the swear words, the cuss words and the words that you can't say,
that you're not supposed to say all the time, cause words or people into
words want to hear your words. Some guys like to record your words
and sell them back to you if they can, (laughter) listen in on .the tele-
phone, write down what words you say. A guy who used to be in Wash-
ington knew that his phone was tapped, used to answer, Fuck Hoover,
yes, go ahead. (laughter) Okay, I was thinking one night about the
words you couldn't say on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you
definitely wouldn't say, ever cause I heard a lady say bitch one night
on television, and it was cool like she was talking about, you know, ah
well, the bitch is the first one to notice that in the litter Johnie right
(murmer) Right. And, uh, bastard you can say, and hell and damn so I
have to figure out which ones you couldn't and ever and it came down
to seven but the list is open to amendment, and in fact, has been
changed, uh, by now, ha, a lot of people pointed things out to me, and
I noticed some myself. The original seven words were, shit, piss, fuck,
cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. Those are the ones that will
curve your spine, grow hair on your hands and (laughter) maybe, even
bring us, God help us, peace without honor (laughter) um, and a bour-
bon. (laughter) And now the first thing that we noticed was that word
fuck was really repeated in there because the word motherfucker is a
compound word and it's another form of the word fuck. (laughter) You
want to be a purist it doesn't really-it can't be on the list of basic
words. Also, cocksucker is a compound word and neither half of that is
really dirty. The word-the half sucker that's merely suggestive (laugh-
ter) and the word cock is a half-way dirty word, 50% dirty-dirty half
the time, depending on what you mean by it. (laughter) Uh, remember
when you first heard it, like in 6th grade, you used to giggle. And the
cock crowed three times, heh (laughter) the cock-three times. It's in
the Bible, cock in the Bible. (laughter) And the first time you heard
about a cock-fight, remember-What? Huh? Naw. It ain't that, are you
stupid? man. (laughter, clapping) It's chickens, you know, (laughter)
Then you have the four letter words from the old Anglo-Saxon fame.
137. 98 S. Ct. at 3041. Printed here with permission of Uptight Enterprises and
Little David Records.
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Uh, shit and fuck. The word, shit, uh, is an interesting kind of word in
that the middle class has never really accepted it and approved it. They
use it like crazy but it's not really okay. It's still a rude, dirty, old kind
of gushy word. (laughter) They don't like that, but they say it, like, they
say it like, a lady now in a middle-class home, you'll hear most of the
time she says it as an expletive, you know. it's out of her mouth before
she knows. She says, Oh shit oh shit, (laughter) oh shit. If she drops
something, Oh, the shit hurt the broccoli. Shit. Thank you. (footsteps
fading away) (papers ruffling)
Read it! (from audience)
Shit! (laughter) I won the Grammy, man, for the comedy album.
Isn't that groovy? (clapping, whistling) (murmur) That's true. Thank
you. Thank you man. Yeah. (murmur) (continuous clapping) Thank
you, man. Thank you. Thank you very much, man. Thank, no, (end of
continuous clapping) for that and for the Grammy, man, cause (laugh-
ter) that's based on people liking it man, yeh, that's ah, that's okay man.
(laughter) Let's let that go, man. I got my Grammy. I can let my hair
hang down now, shit. (laughter) Ha! So! Now the word shit is okay
for the man. At work you can say it like crazy. Mostly figuratively, Get
that shit out of here, will ya? I don't want to see that shit anymore. I
can't cut that shit, budd. I've had that shit up to here. I think you're
full of shit myself. (laughter) He don't know shit from Shi0ola. (laugh-
ter) you know that? (laughter) Always wondered how the Shinola people
felt about that (laughter) Hi, I'm the new man from Shinola. (laughter)
Hi, how are ya? Nice to see ya. (laughter) How are ya? (laughter) Boy,
I don't know whether to shit or wind my watch. (laughter) Guess, I'll
shit on my watch. (laughter) Oh, the shit is going to hit de fan. (laughter)
Built like a brick shit-house. (laughter) Up, he's up shit's creek. (laugh-
ter) He's had it. (laughter) Up, he's up shit's creek. (laughter) He's had
it. (laughter) He hit me, I'm sorry. (laughter) Hot shit, holy shit, tough
shit, eat shit, (laughter) shit-eating grin. Uh, whoever thought of that
was ill. (murmur laughter) He had a shit-eating grin! He had a what?
(laughter) Shit on a stick. (laughter) Shit in a handbag. I always like
that. He ain't worth shit in a handbag. (laughter) Shitty. He acted real
shitty. (laughter) You know what I mean? (laughter) I got the money
back, but a real shitly attitude. Heh, he had a shit-fit. (laughter) Wow!
Shit-fit. Whew! Glad I wasn't there. (murmur, laughter) All the ani-
mals-Bull shit, horse shit, cow shit, rat shit, bat shit. (laughter) Vera
reminded me of that last night, ah (murmur). Snake shit, slicker than
owl shit. (laughter) Get your shit together. Shit or get off the pot.
(laughter) I got a shit-load full of them. (laughter) I got a shit-pot full,
F. C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation 281 11 3:1979
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all right. Shit-head, shit-heel, shit in your heart, shit for brains, (laugh-
ter) shit-face, heh (laughter) I always try to think how that could have
originated; the first guy that said that. Somebody got drunk and fell in
some shit, you know. (laughter) Hey, I'm shit-face. (laughter) Shit-face,
today. (laughter) Anyway, enough of that shit. (laughter) The big one,
the word fuck that's the one that hangs them up the most. Cause in a
lot of cases that's the very act that hangs them up the most. So, it's
natural that the word would, uh, have the same effect. It's a great word,
fuck, nice word, easy word, cute word, kind of. Easy word to say. One
syllable, short u. (laughter) Fuck. (Murmur) You know, it's easy. Starts
with a nice soft sound fuh ends with a kuh. Right? (laughter) A little
something for everyone. Fuck (laughter) Good word. Kind of a proud
word, too. Who are you? I am FUCK. (laughter) FUCK OF THE
MOUNTAIN. (laughter) Tune in again next week to FUCK OF THE
MOUNTAIN. (laughter) It's an interesting word too, cause it's got a
double kind of a life-personality-dual, you know, whatever the right
phrase is. It leads a double life, the word fuck. First of all, it means,
sometimes, most of the time, fuck. What does it mean? It means to
make love. Right? We're going to make love, yeh, we're going to fuck,
yeh, we're going to fuck, yeh, we're going to make love. (laughter) we're
really going to fuck, yeh, we're going to make love. Right? And it also
means the beginning of life, it's the act that begins life, so there's the
word hanging around with words like love, and life, and yet on the other
hand, it's also a word that we really use to hurt each other with, man.
It's a heavy. It's one that you save toward the end of the argument.
(laughter) Right? (laughter) You finally can't make out. Oh, fuck you
man. I said, fuck you. (laughter, murmur) Stupid fuck. (laughter) Fuck
you and everybody that looks like you (laughter) man. It would be nice
to change the movies that we already have and substitute the word fuck
for the word kill, wherever we could, and some of those movie cliches
would change a little bit. Madfuckers still on the loose. Stop me before
I fuck again. Fuck the ump, fuck the ump, fuck the ump, fuck the ump,
fuck the ump. Easy on the clutch Bill, you'll fuck that engine again.
(laughter) The other shit one was, I don't give a shit. Like it's worth
something, you know? (laughter) I don't give a shit. Hey, well, I don't
take no shit, (laughter) you know what I mean? You know why I don't
take no shit? (laughter) Cause I don't give a shit. (laughter) If I give a
shit, I would have to pack shit. (laughter) You wouldn't shit me, would
you? (laughter) That's a joke when you're a kid with a worm looking
out the bird's ass. You wouldn't shit me, would you? (laughter) It's an
eight-year-old joke but a good one. (laughter) The additions to the list.
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I found three more words that had to be put on the list of words you
could never say on television, and they were fart, turd and twat, those
three. (laughter) Fart, we talked about, it's harmless It's like tits, it's a
cutie word, no problem. Turd, you can't say but who wants to, you
know? (laughter) The subject never comes up on the panel so I'm not
worried about that one. Now the word twat is an interesting word.
Twat! Yeh, right in the twat. (laughter) Twat is an interesting word
because it's the only one I know of, the only slang word applying to the,
a part of the sexual anatomy that doesn't have another meaning to it.
Like, ah, snatch, box and pussy all have other meanings, man. Even in
a Walt Disney movie, you can say, We're going to snatch that pussy
and put him in a box and bring him on the airplane. (murmur, laughter)
Everybody loves it. The twat stands alone, man as it should. And two-
way words. Ah, ass is okay providing you're riding into town on a
religious feast day. (laughter) You can't say, up your ass. (laughter) You
can say, stuff it! (murmur) There are certain things you can say its
weird but you can just come so close. Before I cut, I, uh, want to, ah,
thank you for listening to my words, man, fellow, uh, space travelers.
Thank you man for tonight and thank you also. (clapping, whistling)"
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